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Comparing Public Spheres: Normative Models and Empirical 
Measurements 
Abstract 
Most contemporary work on public spheres tends to adopt, either explicitly or 
implicitly, Habermas’ idea of a deliberative public sphere as a normative model. 
There are, however, a number of other normative models available that are rarely 
the subject of scrutiny: republican, liberal, and multicultural.  We pose the 
empirical question of whether actually existing public spheres more closely 
resemble one model rather than another. To answer this question, we develop 
ways to empirically measure public spheres, at both national and trans-national 
level.  We ground this attempt to move comparative media analysis forward 
conceptually and empirically via a case study comparing media content about the 
EU constitution in 6 countries.  
 
Keywords: public sphere, comparative media analysis, content analysis, EU 
constitution, class, nation 
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Introduction 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) have made headway in the field of comparative media, 
developing an empirically informed analysis of media systems and journalistic 
models for Western Europe and North America. Their identification of three ideal 
types of media system – the liberal, the democratic corporatist, and the polarized 
pluralist - has found considerable acceptance. However, progress in developing 
measurements of comparative media has been strictly limited.  
 
This paper takes a different, though not necessarily antagonistic, approach to 
that of Hallin and Mancini by developing the relatively overlooked work of Ferree 
et al (2002a) on comparing public spheres. We argue that public sphere theory is 
an excellent way of categorizing, understanding and explaining the differences 
between public spheres in different parts of the world but, crucially for the 
development of the field of comparative media analysis, this needs to be 
matched by developing better ways to measure public spheres. By focusing on 
the measurement of media content, we show that it is problematic to speak of 
national media systems and/or public spheres and reveal the similarities of public 
spheres across national boundaries. We ground these conceptual, empirical and 
methodological claims via a case study concerning press reporting of the 
European Constitution in six countries: Germany, France, Slovenia, Switzerland, 
the UK and the USA.  
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A Deliberative Public Sphere? 
Despite the ubiquity of the concept of public sphere in the field of communication 
and media research surprisingly little attention has been paid to the different 
varieties of actual and normative public spheres that have developed out of 
contrasting political philosophical traditions and historical circumstances. This 
may be explained by the dominance of Habermas’s thinking. However, a number 
of different conceptualizations for the ideal public sphere exist (Ferree, Gamson, 
Gerhards, and Rucht 2002a). For the purposes of the present article we will 
briefly outline just 3 types of public sphere: the liberal, the republican, and the 
deliberative (that correspond more or less to Hallin and Mancini’s liberal, 
polarized pluralism, and democratic corporatist types of media systems 
respectively). 
 
Liberal Representative (Liberal Elite) Public Sphere 
Essentially this tradition is democratic in the sense that it believes that ‘the public’ 
or ‘the people’ should ultimately rule or express their will through electing 
representatives but that the day-to-day business of politics should be left in the 
hands of a political and/or technocratic elite who argue between themselves as to 
what best to do and make decisions accordingly.  
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The characteristics of the liberal representative public sphere, according to 
Ferree et al, are that debate should be conducted by and for elites against a 
background of a shared political culture based on tolerance of differences of 
opinion and habit. The media presence of competing elites should roughly reflect 
the support that elites can draw on from the public as shown through elections or 
public opinion polls (‘proportionality’). Media institutions should promote 
transparency and provide the electorate with information, suitably simplified, on 
which to base their judgments of the competing parties. Debates should be 
conducted in a dispassionate and civil manner.  Liberal elite public spheres are 
the embodiment of a ‘marketplace of ideas’ where media institutions compete in 
free markets to satisfy the needs of consumers and citizens. Participation in 
public debate about important issues is largely confined to the bourgeoisie and to 
the professional classes. 
 
Participatory Liberal (Republican) Public Sphere 
In contrast to the liberal representative public sphere where the public are 
preferably neither seen nor heard beyond the occasional election, the 
participatory liberal public sphere sees the public’s active engagement in debate 
and decision-making as paramount. Ferree et al mention Rousseau who stands 
tall in the republican tradition of thought. If the liberal representative model can 
be seen as a reaction to the excesses of the French Revolution, the participatory 
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liberal or republican model was a progenitor of it. The public should be involved 
in all decision-making.  
 
Media institutions in a participatory or republican public sphere should promote 
the inclusion of citizens. Citizens must not only be the recipients of public debate 
through consuming media but also participants in the debate through producing 
opinions and arguments. Public debate should not be reserved for elites and 
experts but should reflect the diversity of opinion of all citizens. The poor and the 
weak should not be spoken for but should be themselves speakers in the debate 
and present in making decisions.  
 
Discursive (Deliberative) Public Sphere 
The ideal of a deliberative public sphere is closely associated with the thought of 
Jurgen Habermas, one of the most influential European philosophers and public 
intellectuals of the last fifty years. His work on the public sphere starting in the 
1950s has been so influential that many still labour under the misapprehension 
that his ideal of the deliberative public sphere is the only game in town.  Although 
it took considerable time for Habermas’ book to be translated from German into 
English, by the 1990s the ideal of the public sphere had been taken up by critical 
intellectuals as a way in which to point out the democratic deficits of 
contemporary liberal capitalist societies. The ideal was used as a benchmark 
against which to judge actually existing societies. As the concept has become 
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more widespread, however, it is not clear that it is always now being used in this 
critical normative sense but also as an affirmative a critical description of a 
supposedly existing state of affairs. Calling something a ‘public sphere’ logically 
means that there is also ‘the public’, however emaciated and marginal they may 
actually be to the business of government. This is why it is important to 
distinguish between actually existing public spheres. 
 
The ideal of the deliberative public sphere shares some characteristics of both 
the liberal elite and the republican model. Habermas emphasises popular 
inclusion and civility. Everyone should be able to participate in debate and 
decision-making. In contrast to the republican model, participants should put 
aside individual interests and attempt to argue from the perspective of the 
universal. The only force that is admissible in the deliberative public sphere is the 
force of the better argument and this necessarily requires that all participants 
treat others with respect and civility. Opponents are legitimately defeated only 
through the presentation of better arguments which they themselves come to 
accept. The aim of deliberation is to produce a consensus of equals that leads to 
decisions being made in the common good. 
 
A national public sphere?  
When we speak of the national mode of the public sphere, we acknowledge that 
public spheres are often nationally bounded, but at the same time discursive 
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spaces at the national level are by no means homogeneous. Even though 
national media systems enabled the construction of a common national imagined 
community (Anderson 1983), it is far from obvious that this suffices for the 
development of common national deliberation. Habermas shows that, historically, 
the public sphere was not a sphere of citizens but a sphere of bourgeois 
discourse mediated through newspapers (Habermas 1992: 443). Variations of his 
theory were consequently repeatedly criticized for glossing over the fact that the 
public sphere was dominated by white, property-owning males, and that the 
participation of certain groups – typically working class, women, ethnic or racial 
minorities and immigrants – was thus limited: For instance, Oskar Negt and 
Alexander Kluge (1993 [1977)]) criticized Habermas for his neglect of plebeian 
and proletarian public spheres, while Nancy Fraser (1997: 69-120) has raised the 
issue of the gender bias of the bourgeois public sphere and Jacobs (2000) has 
pointed to the various public spaces and communicative institutions established 
among free African-Americans in the 1700 and the 1800. Most recently, several 
authors have pointed to the proliferation of sub- and trans-national public spheres 
arising along ethnic/national divisions, exemplified in sub-national minority public 
sphericules and transnational diasporic public spheres (Husband 1994; Karim 
2003).  
Rather than limiting the analysis to  nationally and territorially bounded public 
spheres, it is thus more productive to hold open theoretically the possibility of a 
multiplicity of variously sized public spheres, sometimes overlapping but also 
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conflicting (cf. Fraser 1989 on counter-publics). Drawing on the approach 
developed and tested elsewhere (Mihelj et al. 2008), we examine and compare 
the nature of public spheres not only at national level, but also at class level. To 
that end, we distinguish between two main types of class-based public spheres: 
bourgeois public spheres (comprising all broadsheet papers) and working class 
public spheres (comprising tabloids).  
 
Measuring Mass Media Public Spheres  
We identify five familiar criteria against which public spheres can be assessed. 
The first is the degree of political parallelism. This dimension refers to the degree 
to which media institutions are tied to political actors, that is, conceive of 
themselves as particularistic  (of giving priority to one group of political actors 
over others).  The second is external pluralism. This is the degree to which a 
diversity of political position is present in the mass media as a whole. We would 
expect states with more republican public spheres to display greater external 
pluralism than states with liberal public spheres. The reverse is true for internal 
pluralism because mass media in public spheres that approximate the liberal 
model are inclined to see themselves as universalistic platforms, allowing a wide 
variety of different views. In order to fulfill this ideal, journalists in such media 
systems tend to follow objectivity rituals (Tuchman 1972), which results in the 
presentation of more than one viewpoint in the same news story. Democratic 
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corporatist countries lie between these two poles: they tend to exhibit a lower 
degree of political parallelism than the polarized pluralist countries, but at the 
same time they usually do exhibit a certain political ideology. 
Journalistic cultures can also be characterized in terms of polarization. In 
polarized pluralist countries, we expect conflicts to be displayed in a more 
controversial, highly polarized manner, while corporatism lends itself to a more 
centrist debate. Liberal media cultures due to their majoritarian structures rarely 
present more than two viewpoints (Hallin & Mancini 2004: 131), and also lend 
themselves more to centrist debates. 
The fourth criterion is the intensity of the debate: Both deliberative and 
republican styles demand extensive, open ended discussions with no premature 
closure (Ferree et al., 2004). The intensity of the discourse is measured by the 
frequency of the contributions. The final criterion is the inclusiveness of the 
debate, with the deliberative and republican models stressing the importance of 
the participation of a wide range of opinions.  
Public 
Sphere 
Type 
Intensity Political 
Parallelism 
External 
Pluralism 
Inclusiveness 
of Debate 
Polarization 
of Debate 
Republican  high high High high high 
Deliberative high medium medium high medium 
Liberal low low Low low low 
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Table 1: Characteristics of different types of public sphere 
 
Data 
The data for our study were taken from digitized versions of newspapers. In 
the US, German, French, British, and Swiss cases we relied mainly on the on the 
Nexis  database, except for Bild, which was harvested through Google site 
searches from Bild's online paper, which unfortunately does not replicate the print 
version in its entirety. In the Slovenian case, we harvested the data from the 
online archive of the five sampled dailies.1 With the exception of the United 
States, where, due to the foreign nature of the issue we only sampled the three 
quasi-national broadsheets, we aimed to replicate the structures of the press 
markets. In the UK, the market is highly nationalized, we thus sampled all 
nationwide broadsheets, mid-markets, and tabloids, which cover 61% of the total 
dailies market.2 Slovenia’s small market is strongly regionalized.3 That means 
                                                 
1
  Some of these online archives do not provide access to all of the contents published in 
the printed version of respective dailies. However, given the salience of the issue, we expected that news 
about the EU constitution would be prioritized and thus mostly selected for inclusion into on-line content. 
Therefore, we assumed the sample would be representative. 
2
 Calculated from World Asssociation of Newspapers 2005 and 
http://media.guardian.co.uk/circulationfigures/tables/0,,1756045,00.html, accessed: May 1, 2006.  
3
 European Journalism Centre: "The Slovenian Media Landscape," 
http://www.ejc.nl/jr/emland/slovenia.htm, accessed May 1, 2006.  
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that we collected data for five papers combine for a 90% market share in terms of 
circulation figures (Bašić-Hravatin and Milosavljeviæ 2001: 17). Such almost 
universal coverage of the market was not possible in either Germany or France. 
Both countries have a number of regional papers that are market leaders within 
their respective regions. In addition, Switzerland is almost entirely regionalized 
(Hallin and Mancini 2004: 25). Because of the regional proliferation of these 
markets, it was not feasible to cover papers that would combine to similar market 
share figures in each country. Instead, we aimed to include all papers that are 
(according to Adam, Berkel, and Pfetsch 2003: 99-101) quality papers, several 
papers from different regions in these countries and the most important tabloids. 
This way we covered over 30% (Germany), 16% (Switzerland) and 12% (France) 
of the combined market share.4 Notable gaps in our data are the French quality 
daily Le Monde, the French tabloid France Soir, the German financial broadsheet 
Handelsblatt, and the Swiss tabloid Blick. While the sample is not perfectly 
representative of the newspaper markets, it still roughly replicates the newspaper 
media structures in the countries in question. The sample included all articles 
published in the major dailies in each of the six countries, in the period between 
May 1st and December 31st,, 2006.   
                                                 
4
 Calculated from World Asssociation of Newspapers 2005,  
http://213.23.100.232/Wemf/de/Auflagen05/ (accessed May 1,2006; Switzerland),  and 
http://www.ojd.com/fr/adhchif/adhe_list.php?mode=chif&cat=1771 (accessed: May 1, 2006; France), and 
(PR and the Media Office of the Republic of Slovenia 2004). 
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Measurement 
Drawing on claims-making analysis (Koopmans and Statham 1999) we decided 
to map the discourse looking at the voices quoted in the articles in our sample. 
We chose to include the top 30 individuals in terms of frequency of quotation in 
each country we surveyed. This gave a total figure of 119 voices, since a number 
of the voices appeared in the Top 30 in several countries. Of the 119, 117 were 
party politicians, the two remaining people being the French attac president 
Jaques Nikonoff, quoted in just under ½% of all articles, and Pope Benedict XIV, 
who appeared in just over ½% of all articles. Since our topic was the debate on 
an issue that concerned the EU, we excluded non-EU citizens from the analysis 
as these were usually not considered to be agents in the debate. The two by far 
most frequently quoted politicians were France's President Jacques Chirac (in 
36% of articles) and Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair (34%). The French 
Secretary of the Interior, Nicholas Sarkozy (11.3%), German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder (10.8%) and his successor Angela Merkel (9.7%) and the British 
Chancellor Gordon Brown (10.6%) were the next most prominent actors. The 
most prominent actor that was not based in any of the surveyed countries was 
Luxembourg's Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker (9.1%). Politicians from the 
national polities were vastly overrepresented in all four member states, prima 
facie evidence for the existence of national public spheres. 
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Intensity of Debate 
The most straightforward measurement of (print) media discourses is the sheer 
frequency of certain topics or protagonists. In order to measure the prevalence of 
the issue of the EU Constitutional Treaty, we therefore merely had to count the 
number of articles dedicated to the topic that have been published over our 
sampling period. While this is a fairly standard measurement (Risse and van de 
Steeg 2003, Trenz 2004; Downey and Koenig 2006), it contains a serious 
shortcoming: the total number of articles published by a newspaper varies 
systematically with the type of the paper, with ’quality’ newspapers publishing 
many more political articles than ‘popular’ ones. What is more, each paper has a 
specific average number of articles per issue, which due to the lack of systematic 
data is unfortunately unknown. To get at least an approximate weighting that 
reflects the prominence of the debate, we counted the total number of published 
articles in each newspaper on one day (April 18, 2006) and divided the article 
count by this number.5 
Political Parallelism and External Pluralism 
The a priori assessment of the political standing of the newspapers in our sample 
draws both on Hallin and Mancini's typology and our own secondary sources on 
the newspapers in our sample. Our assessment of the papers rests on a two-
dimensional categorization of the papers. On the one hand, most papers can be 
                                                 
5
 This measure excludes Bild, as its online contents are not changed on a daily basis. 
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sorted roughly on the conventional left-right continuum of politics (Hallin & 
Mancini 2004: 27), on the other they either might follow the ideals of ‘objectivity’ 
put forth in American journalism, namely to represent the two major sides of the 
story (Gans 1980; Tuchman 1972) or engage in advocacy journalism. With 
respect to the latter dimension we depart to some extent from Hallin and Mancini, 
in that we expect most of the British newspapers, which usually have a clearly 
distinct political standing (Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 211f), to be in the category of 
advocacy papers. 
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Advocacy Papers on the Political Left  
Post-Communist or Green L'Humanité 
die tageszeitung 
France 
Germany 
Social Democratic Guardian/Observer 
Mirror 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
Left-Liberal The Independent 
Frankfurter Rundschau 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 
Berliner Zeitung 
Libération 
New York Times 
United Kingdom 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
France 
United States 
Centrist Neue Zürcher Zeitung 
Tages-Anzeiger 
Le Temps 
Hamburger Abendblatt 
General-Anzeiger (Bonn) 
Stuttgarter Zeitung 
Bild 
Le Monde 
Sud Ouest (Dimanche) 
Delo 
Dnevnik 
Večer 
Slovenske novice 
Los Angeles Times 
Washington Post 
Switzerland 
Switzerland 
Switzerland 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
France 
France 
Slovenia 
Slovenia 
Slovenia 
Slovenia 
United States 
United Sates 
Conservative Daily Telegraph 
Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung 
United Kingdom 
Germany 
Advocacy Papers on the Political Right  
Clerical La Croix France 
 Financial Times 
The Sun 
Daily Express 
Daily Mail 
Financial Times Deutschland 
Finance 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
Germany 
Slovenia 
 The Times 
Die Welt 
United Kingdom 
Germany 
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Le Figaro France 
Table 2 Political Categorization of the Newspaper Sample 
 (Quality Papers in Bold, financial papers in red, tabloids in green) 
 
Although numerous studies on the alleged political bias of newspapers exist, 
there is no standard quantitative measure for the political standpoint of a 
newspaper in cross-national samples. We based our measure on the assumption 
that most articles will quote those politicians who stand closer to the political 
viewpoint of the author. While it is certainly true that those politicians in higher 
power positions will be more frequently mentioned across the board, the relative 
frequency of the appearance of a politician when compared to other papers will 
give an indication of the preference of the paper. We will also find negatively 
tainted coverage, but as this will be true for all voices and we assume these 
measurement errors to cancel each other over larger samples. We computed the 
political leaning of articles using the formula, 



7
1i
i
m
ia
L  
where ai is the number of actors of a certain political leaning i, the seven 
steps in our political leaning scale according to party affiliation denotes, and m 
the number of total actors quoted in the article. Thus, the greater the percentage 
of actors that come from a certain political party are represented, the closer will 
the index number to 1. The quotation of persons from both extremes of the 
This is a pre-print version. Final version: Downey, J. and Mihelj, S. (2012) ‘Comparing 
Public Spheres: Normative Models and Empirical Measurements’, European Journal of 
Communication 27(4): 337-553. 
 
18 | P a g e  
 
political spectrum would lead to an overall more centrist categorization of the 
corresponding article. We categorized each actor along the left-right scale 
displayed in Table . While the different parties obviously contain national 
differences, the fact that they actually are in alliance with each other on the 
European level, shows that our categorization is not entirely arbitrary. 
Left-Right 
Categorization 
Party Affiliation Ran
k 
Post-Communist PCF, PDS, WASG 1 
Green/Left-Liberal attac, Les Verts, Die Grünen 2 
Liberal Liberal Democrats, D'66, LDS  3 
Social-Democrat Labour, PS, SPD, PvdA, SPÖ, SD 4 
Neo-Liberal UDF, FDP, VVD 5 
Conservative/Christian 
Democrat 
Tories, RPF, CDU/CSU, SDS, SKD, SLS, Nsi 6 
Post-Fascist, 
Separatist-Nationalist 
Front National, NPD, AN, Wilders, SNS 7 
Table 3 Categorization of Party Affiliation 
Inclusiveness 
As with the political valency of articles, there is no standard way to measure 
the diversity of opinions expressed in a newspaper. We constructed, therefore, a 
series of four indices for to measurethis. By using four indices in parallel, we 
minimized the danger that our results would merely be an artifact of our l 
methods. The indices use the following notation: 
 ai: the number of actors of political persuasion i mentioned in the 
article 
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 xi: the binary variable, if an actor of political persuasion i mentioned in 
the article 
 m: the total number of actors in the article 
 were calculated as follows: 
(1) 

7
1i
ix  
This index posits that an ideally balanced discourse would voice the opinions of 
all relevant political positions - the more positions are quoted the more pluralism 
exists. It increases with every additional point of view being voiced, regardless of 
its framing. 
(2)  
 









6
1
7
1
)(
i ij
jixxij   
The second index starts with the assumption that opinions can be categorized 
along a one-dimensional left-right scale and favours those articles 
that contain positions further apart from each other. The more actors are 
mentioned, the larger the sum will be as there will be fewer summands jixx  that 
will be zero, but the expression (j-i) ensures that views that are further apart from 
each other are weighted more heavily, as they often allow for intermediate views 
to be implicitly present. 
 (3) 
 









6
1
7
1
3 )(
i ij
jixxij  
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However, since index (2) heavily favours the mentioning of positions on the 
political extremes, we decided to correct the linear impact of distances between 
positions by discounting the distances using a function with a highly negative 
second derivative, in this case the cubic root function. Index three thus contains 
the same assumptions as index 1 but tests for the robustness of that index. 
(4) 
 







 6
1
7
1
3
2
)(
i ij
ji
m
m
aaij
 
Finally index (4) takes into account the relative strength of the number of actors 
of a certain political persuasion, arguing that not only the range of views 
expressed contributes to internal pluralism, but also the even-handedness. It 
expands on index two by introducing a quantitative approximate measure of how 
elaborately certain voices are presented in the article when compared to others.  
 
Polarization 
Hallin and Mancini hypothesize that the polarized-pluralist media system will 
exhibit debates tending to emphasize the extremes. Again unfortunately, there is 
no standard measure for the polarization of a debate. We developed, therefore, 
an index to measure polarization by simply adding the proportion of actors from 
political extremes – post-communists, Greens, post-fascists and nationalist 
separatists – that are mentioned in the article: 
m
aaa
P 721

  
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The idea behind this index is that most newspaper articles will usually set out the 
positions of the two main political parties, which suits the generic journalistic 
conflict frame. Any further positions are often perceived to complicate the story 
unduly, which frequently leads to the omission of minor views from the story 
(usually views from the political extremes). On the other hand, parties around the 
center of the political spectrum tend to compete for voters of the other 
mainstream party or parties, which moderates their voice as they do not wish to 
repel voters with centrist views. Based on this assumption, this index counts the 
voices from the two extreme ends of the political spectrum in proportion to all 
actors that are quoted in an article. It is designed as a proxy measure for both the 
extent to which the debate has been polarized in the different countries and by 
association the tone of the debate. Admittedly, whether polarized debates lead to 
a more confrontational style of debate is open to question, but the instances we 
checked confirmed this to be the case.  
 
Results 
Intensity of the Debate 
Table 4 shows that the debate about the EU Constitution received uneven 
attention across Europe. The results do not confirm the expected 
differences in intensity arising from different public sphere types that we 
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imagined, France (republican public sphere and polarized pluralist media 
system), Germany (deliberative public sphere and democratic-corporatist 
media system) and the UK (liberal elite public sphere and liberal media 
system) to represent. Instead, the intensity was primarily dependent on the 
presence/absence of elite cleavages in a particular country. Although the 
figures need to be treated with caution due to the French referendum and 
the British EU presidency during our sampling period, we can see that the 
intensity was lowest in Germany, Slovenia and Switzerland – countries 
where the EU Constitution provoked hardly any elite cleavages. The US, in 
turn, being not only outside the EU, but also outside Europe, unsurprisingly 
managed not even one tenth of the interest present in the European 
countries. .  
France 5.81   Quality Press 3.77 
United Kingdom 5.24  ocals/Midmarket 2.54 
Germany 2.32   Tabloids .09 
Slovenia 2.75   
Switzerland 2.00   
United States .16   
Table 4 Average Frequency of Articles6 
Party politicians were the dominant actors in all of the public spheres surveyed. 
This should give cause for reflection before allocating countries to separate types 
of public sphere. Given the dominance of elite political actors and the importance 
                                                 
6
 Sunday Papers weighted with 1/6. 
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of elite dissensus for generating greater intensity of debate, we may conclude 
that all of the public spheres surveyed fit best with a liberal elite model of the 
public sphere at least using this criterion. 
 
While there are inter-national differences in terms of debate intensity, these pale 
in comparison to the intra-national differences. While the quality papers and 
regional as well as midmarket papers are not too far apart from each other, the 
index figure for the five German and British tabloids, which have a circulation 
roughly double7 that of the respective broadsheet market, produce an intensity 
index of .09, not even half the figure for the US papers, which trail the British 
papers by about 20 times. Bourgeois public spheres very clearly have more in 
common in terms of intensity of debate with each other than with ‘their’ co-
national working class public sphere. 
Political Parallelism and External Pluralism 
Taking only those papers that had at minimum 50 articles in the sample to avoid 
irregularities that might arise from random errors, Table  shows that our index 
mirrors, with exception of Sud Ouest and Berliner Zeitung, the hypothesized 
political leaning extraordinarily well (confirming what we already know but also 
suggesting that this measurement at least is robust). The advocacy papers line 
                                                 
7
 Computed from the data in 
http://media.guardian.co.uk/circulationfigures/tables/0,,1756045,00.html, last accessed: May 1, 2006. 
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up on the two ends of the spectrum, even though the diversity might not be as 
strong as some might have expected, as Financial Time and tageszeitung are a 
mere standard deviation away from each other (p<.001). When coding the 
predicted paper standpoint on a ordinal scale from one to fourteen with one being 
the socialist partisan papers and 14 the conservative partisan papers, both 
Pearson's r=.08 and Kendall's τb=.16 show significant (p<.001) positive 
correlations. 
 
We also get a glimpse of the diversity of opinions presented in the different 
countries: While the German and French papers are spread throughout the entire 
spectrum, the British papers, with the exception of the Daily Mirror, cluster 
around the center. The Slovenian dailies cover a wide range of territory, which 
would have even been greater, had we not excluded Finance (with an index 
value of 9.82) because it had too few articles to be included in our sample. 
Finally, the Swiss papers show a remarkably uniform right-wing bias, all scoring 
at the right of the political spectrum. 
 
Paper 
Left-
Right 
Varianc
e 
taz 8.91 2.48 
Sud-Ouest 8.91 2.16 
Daily Mirror 9.08 1.08 
L'Humanité 9.09 2.29 
Dnevnik 9.09 2.12 
Libération 9.11 2.22 
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Independent on 
Sunday 9.14 1.27 
General-Anzeiger 9.16 1.56 
Frankfurter Rundschau 9.25 1.85 
Times 9.28 1.38 
Vecer 9.29 1.77 
Independent 9.30 1.60 
Observer 9.32 1.48 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 9.33 1.77 
Daily Telegraph 9.37 1.48 
Hamburger Abendblatt 9.42 1.50 
Sunday Telegraph 9.42 1.56 
Les Echos 9.44 1.48 
Guardian 9.44 1.44 
Die Welt 9.51 1.70 
NZZ 9.54 1.75 
Delo 9.54 1.71 
Le Figaro 9.56 1.45 
Tages-Anzeiger 9.66 1.67 
L'Express 9.69 1.63 
La Croix 9.71 2.07 
Le Temps 9.71 1.36 
Financial Times 9.76 1.41 
Berliner Zeitung 9.82 1.26 
Table 5 Left-Right Position of Papers according to actors cited 
Inclusiveness 
Most democratic theories consider inclusiveness of citizenry participation an 
integral element for the functioning of democracy. Inclusiveness can be meant in 
two ways: actual participation of the citizens or inclusion of as many viewpoints 
as possible in the debate. Since in modern nation states the actual participation 
of the entire citizenry would for reasons of scale lead to noise, we follow the 
deliberative and multicultural models of the public sphere that advocate as many 
different positions are heard as possible. The UK with its majoritarian system and 
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its corresponding liberal conception of the public sphere does display a smaller 
degree of respect to internal pluralism. Two sides of the argument may be 
represented in the ‘quality’ press but the distance between the sides is 
comparatively small. It is not the corporatist countries that had the politically 
widest coverage of the Constitution issue, but ‘republican’ France – a result that 
may challenge the idea that deliberative public spheres are best. 
Table 6 displays the mean value of the inclusiveness index as it has been 
computed in (3), which we consider the most adequate measurement for 
inclusiveness. However, the results using the three remaining indices (and by 
implication any other potential indices that would lie in the function space 
between (1) and (4) resulted in substantively the same results, all of which 
having F-Values for the analysis of variance that are below p<.0001). 
The relative exclusivity of the UK, could especially when taken in conjunction 
with the fact that the US displayed similar levels of exclusivity, be read as a 
structural feature of the debate in countries with majoritarian party systems. 
 
 Mean Index 
Value 
 Mean Index 
Value 
France 2.45   Partisan Papers 2.51   
Germany 1.97   Broadsheets 2.02   
Slovenia 1.70   Financial Papers 1.37   
Switzerland 1.54   All Others 1.74   
United Kingdom 1.54     
United States 1.11     
(F=17.6, p<.0001)  (F=17.9, p<.0001)  
Table 6 Internal Pluralism Index by Country and Newspaper Type 
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Given the widespread assumption that national public spheres exist we were 
surprised to find that intra-national differences are larger than those across 
countries. When considered separately, the British tabloids achieve an index 
value of only 0.9, The financial papers across nation-states were also 
predominantly single-sourced. It seems reasonable to conclude that different 
class-based public spheres are a more accurate description of actually existing 
public spheres than a single national public sphere.  
 
Polarization 
The same pattern also emerges with respect to the polarization of the discourse. 
We take polarization as a proxy for both the civility as well as the degree to which 
Hallin and Mancini's (2004) idea of polarized pluralism is implemented in the 
different media systems. This time, our data almost perfectly fit the expectations, 
with the debate in France being the most polarized and in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries the least polarized. Partly, this is of course an effect of the different  
print media configurations across the different countries: partisan papers, which 
are common-place only in France maintain the most controversial debating style 
citing both sources from the political standpoint of the paper and those farthest 
away from them to emphasize the collective identity of its readership. 
Consequently, this type of paper demonstrates the strongest polarization index 
values. Tabloid papers are on the lower end of the polarization index, on the 
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other hand. While having a clear political preference, they strive to report  one of 
the mainstream views. Public spheres where this type of paper is prevalent, 
specifically Britain, consequently tend to favor a debate that focuses on centrist 
policy options only: Interestingly, not only partisan papers tend towards a more 
polarized debate, but also the financial broadsheets tend to give more voice to 
those at the fringes of the political spectrum. Together with their political 
positioning, this might indicate that these papers are indeed partisan, favouring 
neo-liberal policies.  
 Mean Index 
Value 
 Mean Index 
Value 
France 0.14   Partisan papers 0.15   
Germany 0.11   Broadsheets 0.04   
Slovenia 0.10   Financial 0.09   
Switzerland 0.06   All others 0.11   
United Kingdom 0.04       
United States 0.03      
(F=60.9, p<.0001)  (F=40.2, p<.0001)  
Table 7 Measures of Polarization of the Debate 
 
Usually at this point in the article readers are presented with a table 
comparing the results country by country. These results most often refer to data 
from only ‘quality’ newspapers in the respective states that are taken to represent 
national public spheres. Our research makes such a presentation problematic. 
While there are shared characteristics across quality, regional and popular titles 
within states (for example, referring predominantly to national actors) there are 
substantial differences (intensity, inclusiveness) that preclude us from speaking 
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of national public spheres. Instead we can speak of nationally-bounded 
(readership and reference to actors) class-based public spheres. We are 
convinced that had we looked at ethnic minority press an even more complicated 
picture would have emerged.  
While it is relatively easy to compare bourgeois public spheres across 
Europe through reference primarily to similar types of newspapers, this task is far 
more difficult for working class public spheres because of the contrasting 
histories and present day circumstances of the popular press across countries. 
As Hallin and Mancini point out, countries with high illiteracy rates in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not develop a popular press and it is 
television that presently caters for popular taste in these countries. If we wish to 
compare working class public spheres therefore we need to go beyond 
newspapers and consider television. While this poses more problems in terms of 
data collection than newspapers, the methods that we have developed here 
could easily be applied to, for example, television news. (They could also be 
used to compare the output of public service and commercial television stations.) 
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Conclusion 
In this article we have sought to offer an alternative to Hallin and Mancini’s 
comparative analysis based on a more comprehensive understanding of public 
sphere theory than that conventionally offered. Following the work of Ferree et al, 
we identify different and competing philosophical and historical trajectories of 
public spheres. We also offer a variety of ways to test this theoretical 
understanding through developing ways to measure the characters of public 
spheres. In principle, public sphere theories and the methods of measurement 
outlined here can be applied across time and space, across the range of subjects 
of public debate, and across media. No doubt there will be disagreements about 
what should be measured, which measurements to use, and how they should be 
operationalised. We would be happy to provoke such methodological discussion 
as it would in itself signal the growing maturity of comparative media as a field of 
analysis. 
Our survey of a broader cross-section of newspapers than is commonly offered 
revealed the existence of profound class cleavages within national boundaries. 
To speak of homogeneous national public spheres, therefore, is wrong. There 
are rather class-based more or less nationally-bounded public spheres. 
Bourgeois public spheres resemble each other more closely than their working 
class co-national public spheres. In addition, although there are differences 
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between countries belonging, we were struck by the similarities, in particular the 
central importance of national party political elites as actors and the importance 
of national elite dissensus as a progenitor of media debate. While the French and 
German bourgeois public spheres may be more pluralistic and inclusive than in 
the UK, they also share characteristics of a liberal elite public sphere. The results 
highlight the gap between republican and deliberative normative conceptions of 
the public sphere and actually existing public spheres and thus the importance of 
specifying more precisely what it is that we refer to when we use the concept of 
public sphere to denote an actually existing state of affairs. Otherwise, the 
concept of public sphere will be emptied of its critical character. 
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